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The timing of strategic investments is among the most common problems in corporate finance and
corporate strategy, respectively. Due to inherent uncertainty an investor has to face the trade-off be-
tween early commitment to profit from first-mover advantages and late commitment due to mainte-
nance of flexibility. The latter case is a result of the irreversible nature of most strategic investments,
i.e. once an investment is made the incurred sunk costs cannot be recovered should the project benovation
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tool to address these issues and the literature has provided various examples that give guidance on
how to optimally time an investment under uncertainty (see e.g., Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Trigeorgis,
1998; Kort et al., 2010). Real options express the flexibility assigned to a decision, i.e. for example the
decision to delay an investment or to abandon an investment project without being obliged to.1 Here,
the simple investment opportunity represents a perpetual American Call option and the resulting invest-
ment–uncertainty relationship is traditionally considered to have negative sign, i.e. the higher the uncer-
tainty the higher the propensity to postpone the investment.
Only recently, however, it has been shown that the investment–uncertainty relationship is not nec-
essary monotonic and that it can be viewed through multiple lenses which may result in a differing
observed sign of this relationship (see e.g. Sarkar, 2000; Lund, 2005; Wong, 2007; Gryglewicz et al.,
2008). In particular, the investment–uncertainty relationship can be interpreted as
(i) the influence of uncertainty on the value of the optimal investment threshold,
(ii) the influence of uncertainty on the expected time until investment, i.e. the influence of uncer-
tainty on the expected time to hit the threshold,
(iii) the influence of uncertainty on the probability to invest in a pre-specified time, i.e. the influence
of uncertainty on the probability to hit the threshold in a pre-specified time.2
By correcting the usual assumption in the extent literature that the risk-adjusted return on a pro-
ject is invariant to the volatility of an investment’s returns Sarkar (2000) demonstrates in a numerical
example that the influence of uncertainty on the probability to invest in a pre-specified time can have
an ambiguous sign. However, in his example the influence of uncertainty on the value of the optimal
investment threshold and on the expected time until investment is still strictly positive. His second
main contribution is, though, to show that implementing the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to
account for the risk-return relationship is not a sufficient constraint in order to observe a non-
monotonic investment–uncertainty relationship either by means of an optimal investment threshold
or by means of an expected hitting time. Rather, the subsequent literature highlights that one of the
two other constraints must hold. Firstly, it is the discounted project value of an investment that be-
haves according to a geometric-Brownian motion. By focusing on this assumptionWong (2007) shows
that uncertainty has a U-shaped influence on the value of the investment threshold as well as on the
expected time until investment. This holds in particular if the risk-adjusted rate of return on the pro-
ject is positively related to uncertainty. Or secondly, the investment project life is finite. As shown by
Gryglewicz et al. (2008) uncertainty has a U-shaped influence on the value of the investment thresh-
old as well as on the expected time until investment if and only if the project life is finite and the risk-
adjusted rate of return on the project is positively related to uncertainty.3
This paper extends the depicted stream of literature by introducing a third setting that give rise to
an ambiguous uncertainty–investment relationship, i.e. the bargaining situation. In particular, we
show that a U-shaped pattern of the influence of uncertainty on the value of the investment threshold
and on the expected time until investment exist if the investment decision is the outcome of the
sequential bargaining of two parties which both have to bear part of the investment costs and the
risk-adjusted rate of return on the project is positively related to uncertainty. Such a setting may exist
in any situations where two individuals jointly decide on the implementation of investment projects,
such as in manager–shareholder or customer–supplier relationships. However, timing of an invest-
ment occurs inefficiently late in the sequential bargaining setting. Specifically, the socially inefficiency
is the more pronounced the higher the fraction of costs the second player has to bear. While these ef-
fects are partly due to a first-mover advantage we furthermore show that the resulting first-mover
advantage is also non-monotonically affected by uncertainty. We thereby add also new insights to1 For example Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
2 Following Lund (2005) the investment–uncertainty relationship can also be interpreted as the influence of uncertainty on the
expected aggregate investment in a pre-specified time for firms with several investment opportunities.
3 Interestingly, the influence of uncertainty on the probability to invest in a pre-specified time is analyzed in neither Wong
(2007) nor Gryglewicz et al. (2008).
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tainty (see e.g., Morellec and Zhdanov, 2005; Hackbarth and Morellec, 2008; Lambrecht, 2004; Hack-
barth and Miao, 2012; Lukas and Welling, 2012).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two presents the model and characterizes the
solution along two prominent measures in the real option literature, i.e. investment threshold and ex-
pected hitting time. Of special interest are the impact of bargaining and the CAPM on the investment–
uncertainty relationship and the surplus distribution among the agents. Section three illustrates
numerically the impact of uncertainty on timing and on the size of the first-mover advantage. Finally,
section four concludes and lays out directions for future research.
2. The model
In the following, we deviate from a canonical real options model à la Dixit and Pindyck (1994). In
particular, consider an investment project whose net cash flow per unit time, x(t), can be expressed by
the following stochastic differential equation:4 We
offer isdxðtÞ ¼ axðtÞdt þ rxðtÞdWðtÞ; xð0Þ ¼ x0 ð1Þ
with r 2 Rþ as the volatility of the cash flow stream and a 2 R as the drift rate. The investment pro-
ject’s life is finite of length T 2 Rþ. Hence, the project’s present value V(t) is the given by:VðtÞ ¼ E
Z Tþt
t
xðsÞelðstÞds
 
¼ xt
Z Tþt
t
eðlaÞðstÞds ¼ xt 1 e
ðrþkqraÞT
r þ kqr a ; ð2Þwhere E[  ] denotes the expectations operator, l ¼ r þ kqr as the risk adjusted discount rate,
k ¼ ðlM  rÞ=rM denotes the market price of risk with lM and rM as the return and volatility of the
market portfolio and r as the riskless rate of interest. Consequently, the dynamics of V(t) are also gov-
erned by a geometric Brownian motion, i.e.:dVðtÞ ¼ aVðtÞdt þ rVðtÞdWðtÞ; Vð0Þ ¼ V0: ð3Þ
In contrast to the previous mentioned literature, however, we will assume that investment in the
project requires the actions of two participating individuals A and B. Individual A compensates B by
transferring a portion of the asset value wV(x) to the second individual B upon investment while B
times the initiation of the investment project. Moreover, investment in the project is associated with
sunk costs I 2 Rþ and we will assume that A and B incur the fraction (1  e)I and eI, respectively. Here,
e e [0, 1] expresses the distribution of sunk costs between the two individuals and is provided exoge-
nously. The simplest example for such an investment setting would be the initiation of a greenfield
joint venture where profits and costs are generally shared or a principal-agent setting under complete
information.
We assume that time is continuous, i.e. t e [t0,1) and rely on a Markovian Perfect Nash Equilibrium
to determine the equilibrium strategy for both parties. In particular, as in Lukas and Welling (2012), A
optimally defines w in stage one and conditional on the offered premium w B will choose a threshold
value V(w) or xðwÞ :¼ 1eðrþkqraÞTrþkqra
 1
VðwÞ, respectively, in stage two at which the offer will be ac-
cepted. Thus,t :¼ inf t P t0jxðtÞP xf g ¼ inf t P t0jVðtÞP Vf g ð4Þ
is the time of investing. However, B has not to decide immediately at time t0 of the offer whether it
accepts or rejects the offer. Rather, we assume that B can postpone the decision. To be more precise,
while A has the action set w e (0,1), B has at every point in time the action set {accept, wait}. This de-
gree of managerial flexibility B possesses can be interpreted as a real option. Exercising the option
right refers to accepting the offer by initiating the investment project.4will assume that this managerial flexibility is not limited by a fixed maturity date. Therefore the possibility to accept the
a perpetual real option.
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solution of the following maximization problem in stage two5:5 Thr
Otherw
surplusFðxÞ ¼ max
s
E
ð1 edTÞ
d
wxs  eI
 
eðrþkqrÞs
 
; ð5Þwhere d ¼ r þ kqr a denotes the convenience yield (or rate of shortfall) of the investment opportu-
nity. Hence, the value F(x(t)) of the investment option is solution to the differential equation1
2
r2xðtÞ2F 00ðxðtÞÞ þ ða kqrÞxðtÞF 0ðxðtÞÞ  rFðxðtÞÞ ¼ 0; ð6Þwith the boundary condition F(0) = 0, the value-matching conditionFðxðwÞÞ ¼ 1 e
dT 	
d
wxðwÞ  eI; ð7Þand the smooth-pasting conditionF 0ðxðwÞÞ ¼ ð1 e
dTÞ
d
w: ð8ÞSolving Eq. (5) yields:FðxðwÞÞ ¼
ð1edT Þ
d wx
ðwÞ  eI
 
x
xðwÞ
 b
if x < xðwÞ
ð1edT Þ
d wx eI if xP xðwÞ
8<
: ð9Þwithb ¼ 1
2
 a kqr
r2
þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1
2
 a kqr
r2
 2
þ 2r
r2
s
> 1 ð10ÞandxðwÞ ¼ dð1 edTÞ
b
b 1
eI
w
: ð11ÞIn contrast, the bidding firm A will choose w in stage one such that it maximizesf ðwÞ ¼ max
w
E
ð1 edTÞ
d
ð1 wÞxðwÞ  ð1 eÞI
 
eðrþkqrÞt

 
¼ max
w
ð1 edTÞ
d
ð1 wÞxðwÞ  ð1 eÞI
 
x0
xðwÞ
 b" #
; ð12Þsubject to the other party’s reaction function, i.e. x(w). Solving
@ ð1e
dT Þ
d ð1 wÞxðwÞ  ð1 eÞI
 
x0
xðwÞ
 b 
@w ¼ 0 we get the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The optimal offered portion w results to:w ¼ ðb 1Þeðb 1Þ þ e : ð13ÞUsing this result in Eq. (11) leads to the following proposition.oughout the analysis we assume that the current spot value is sufficient low so that investment occurs not immediately.
ise, immediate exercise is optimal and the results equal a 2-person ultimatum game where the first person gets the entire
and the remaining agents get nothing.
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1 edTð Þ 1þ
e
b 1
 
b
b 1 I: ð14ÞIn a cooperative framework, i.e. the parties act as a central planer, the optimal timing threshold isxeff ¼
d
ð1 edTÞ
b
b 1 I: ð15ÞHence, we havex ¼ 1þ e
b 1
 
xeff ; ð16Þwhere xeff denotes the investment threshold derived in Gryglewicz et al. (2008). It is obvious that our
investment threshold is proportional to xeff ðr; dðrÞ; bðdðrÞÞÞ. Thus, for the sensitivity with respect to
uncertainty it follows that:@x
@r ¼
@xeff
@r þ e
@
x
eff
b1
 
@r : ð17ÞFollowing Gryglewicz et al. (2008), we have that the derivative of the investment threshold with
respect to uncertainty is composed of at least three effects, i.e. (1) discounting effect, (2) volatility effect
and (3) a convenience yield effect. The latter two can be combined and characterize the option effect.
The discounting effect describes the impact of uncertainty on the discount rate of an all-equity financed
firm. Here, rising uncertainty raises the discount rate of the investment and thus reduces its NPV. Con-
sequently, a positive impact always prevails. The option effect, however, has an ambiguous sign. The
direct impact of uncertainty on the option to wait is measured by the volatility effect. Here, a positive
impact is admitted because of the insurance property of an option. In particular, an increase of uncer-
tainty increases the upside potential while the downside payoff remains unaffected. Consequently,
opportunity cost of investing rise and so does the propensity to wait. The convenience yield effect,
however, is negative, i.e. higher uncertainty provokes an individual to invest earlier. This is due to
the fact that due to dðrÞ ¼ r þ kqr a the convenience yield (or return shortfall) increases as sigma
rises and thus raises the attractiveness of possessing the investment project’s net cash flows, i.e. x(t).
Due to sequential bargaining, however, a fourth effect occurs, i.e. the bargaining effect that is only
present when the agents share the investment cost, i.e. e > 0. To see this, expanding Eq. (17) results to:: ð18ÞWith respect to Eq. (18) bargaining impacts the investment trigger’s sensitivity in two ways. Disman-
tling the bargaining effect by means of@ 1b1
 
@b
¼ bðb 1Þ
1
xeff
@xeff
@b
; ð19Þyields:: ð20Þ
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ular, the first term is due to b > 0 strictly positive, i.e. 1 + e/(b  1) > 0. Consequently, the discounting
effect remains positive. Also, from Eq. (20) it is obvious that the volatility effect remains positive while
the convenience yield effect remains negative stating that again a U-shape pattern might arise when
uncertainty is considerable low. Consequently, the convenience yield effect dominates the other two
effects and any increase in uncertainty will raise the propensity to invest. For considerable high uncer-
tainties, however, the volatility effect dominates the convenience yield effect so that the option effect
changes sign. Consequently, an increase in uncertainty will unequivocally lead to a postponement of
the investment.
Eq. (20), however, also reveals that the option effect is over-proportional affected by bargaining.
This is because 1 + e/(b  1) < 1 + e(b + 1)/(b  1). Hence, due to bargaining the overall impact of the
three effects becomes deterred in favor of the option effect. Should the uncertainty level be very
low, so that the convenience yield effect dominates we see that an increase in uncertainty will lower
the additional impact of discounting due to bargaining while it will lower the additional impact of the
volatility and convenience yield effect due to bargaining to a much lesser degree. Of course, the effect
is further amplified the more costs are assigned to the reacting party. On the contrary, should the over-
all option effect become positive we observe that for an increase in uncertainty the additional dis-
counting, volatility and convenience yield effects exert a negative impact on timing and thus
leading to further postponement of the investment. Again, this effect is the more amplified the more
costs are assigned to the reacting party.
Finally, for T?1 it is just the option effect of bargaining that determines the sign of ox/or. To see
this, recall that Eq. (18) can be rewritten as:6 Plea
determ
thresho
a is con
shortfal
7 If a
E½t ¼ 1@x
@r

T!1
¼ 1þ e
b 1
 
Ib
ðb 1Þ2
1
L1
ðrðb 1Þðr þ 1=2ðb 1Þkqr lÞÞ
 !
|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
Sum of all effects
þ e
b 1
 
Ib
ðb 1Þ2
1
L1
 
rðb 1Þðr þ ðb 1=2Þr2Þ  kqðr þ ðb 1=2Þr2Þ 	|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
extra volatiliy and convenience yield effect due to bargaining
ð21Þwith L1 ¼ ðb 1=2Þr2 þ l kqr. Consequently, the first term of the RHS disappears for low uncer-
tainty (r? 0) and ox/or becomes negative. Moreover, for considerable high values of uncertainty
the discount effect and the volatility effect dominate and the overall sign becomes positive. Thus, even
for infinitively long-lived investment projects a U-shaped investment–uncertainty relationship pre-
vails should individuals bargain about investment and e > 0. These results lead to the following
proposition:
Proposition 3. In a real sequential bargaining setting, i.e. e > 0, the influence of uncertainty on the optimal
timing threshold x is non-monotonic if kq > 06: For small levels of uncertainty growing uncertainty is
reducing the optimal timing threshold while for high levels of uncertainty growing uncertainty is increasing
the optimal timing threshold. The results also hold for infinite-lived investment projects, i.e. T =1.
To what extent do these results hold with respect to the expected hitting time as an alternative mea-
sure for depicting the investment–uncertainty relationship? FromWong (2007) we know that as long
as r 2 0;
ffiffiffiffiffiffi
2a
p h
we have7se note, that for kq ¼ 0 the discount effect and the convenience yield effect vanish and it is only the volatility effect that
ines the investment–uncertainty relationship. Thus, an increase in uncertainty always leads to a higher investment
ld. Furthermore, the result depends on the fact that the return shortfall d(r) is varying with uncertainty, while the drift rate
stant. It is easy to show that the optimal timing threshold x would be monotonically increasing in uncertainty if the return
l would be constant while the drift rate depends on uncertainty, i.e. a(r).
6 0 or r R 0;
ffiffiffiffiffiffi
2a
p h
the probability that the investment threshold will never be reached is greater than zero and hence
as long as x0 < x .
8 Like
depend
monoto
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ln xx0
 
a r22
< 1: ð22Þand thus@E½t
@r
¼ 1
ða r22 Þ
2 r ln
x
x0
 
þ a r
2
2
 
1
x
@x
@r
 
: ð23ÞObviously, it is lim
r!
ffiffiffiffi
2a
p E½t ¼ 1. Furthermore, for r = 0 we get
@E½t
@r

r¼0
¼ 1
a
1
x
@x
@r
< 0; ð24Þwhereby we use that @x
@r

r¼0 < 0 if kq > 0 (see e.g. Proposition 3). Thus, we can state the following
proposition:
Proposition 4. In a real sequential bargaining setting, i.e. e > 0, the influence of uncertainty on the
expected investment time is non-monotonic, if kq > 0 and a > 0.8
One more result is deducible from Eq. (15). Because of ð1þ eb1Þ > 1 the parties time the investment
inefficiently late after sequential bargaining which leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 5. The investment in the project happens inefficiently late if it is bargained sequentially by the
two parties and if e > 0. Specifically, the social inefficiency is the more pronounced the higher the fraction of
cost the second player has to bear.
However, three limiting cases exist in which the sequentially bargained deal becomes social effi-
cient: First, if the second player bears no investment costs his optimal threshold equals the social effi-
cient threshold. As we will see in Eq. (27) the second player does not generate any surplus under that
setting. Hence, this setting is equivalent to the non-game-theoretical model in Gryglewicz et al. (2008)
which therefore can be seen as a special and limiting case of our game-theoretic model. Second, sit-
uations may occur where postponement of the investment would generate no extra value. In partic-
ular, a very large discount rate r implies that the individual will place a high weight on the immediate
present. As a consequence, immediate investment represents the second limiting case. Likewise, in ab-
sence of uncertainty, i.e. r = 0, a negative growth rate, i.e. a 6 0, causes x(t) to remain constant or fall
over time and thus it is again optimal to invest immediately if x0 > dð1edT Þ I and never to invest
otherwise.
Finally, we will give an answer to the question how much of wealth is distributed to the parties? In
the continuation region, i.e. x0 < x the generated surplus equals:GðV0Þ ¼ GðVðx0ÞÞ ¼ ð1 e
dTÞ
d
x  I
 
x0
x
 b
¼ b
b 1þ e
b
ðb 1Þ2
 1
 !
I
x0
1þ eb1
 
b
b1 I
0
@
1
Ab: ð25ÞBecause A is the offering party and thus holds the bargaining power, its expected profit equals sA-
G(V(x0)) with a share of the surplus of:sA ¼
1 ðb1Þeðb1Þþe
 
ð1edT Þ
d x
  ð1 eÞI
 
ðx0xÞ
b
ð1edT Þ
d x
  I
 
x0
x
 	b ¼ eþ b 1ebþ b 1 : ð26ÞProposition 3 this result also depends on the fact that the drift rate is seen to be constant while the return shortfall
s on uncertainty. Depending on the other parameter values switching this assumption may lead to a vanishing non-
nicity of the uncertainty’s influence on the expected time until investment.
32 E. Lukas, A. Welling / Finance Research Letters 11 (2014) 25–35In contrast, the reacting party receives the fraction sBG(V(x0)) withsB ¼ 1 sA ¼ eb eebþ b 1 : ð27ÞBecause of sB ¼ ebeebþb1 ¼ ðb1Þeebþb1 < ðb1Þþeebþb1 ¼ sA we get the following proposition:
Proposition 6. The expected profit for being the offering party is greater than for being the reacting party,
i.e. sB < sA.
As is shown in Wong (2007) if kq > 0 we have @b
@r > 0 for small values of uncertainty and
@b
@r < 0 for
higher values of uncertainty. With @sA
@b ¼  e
2
ðbeþb1Þ2 < 0 we can therefore state the following
proposition:
Proposition 7. Uncertainty has an ambivalent influence on this first-mover-advantage if kq > 0. For small
levels of uncertainty growing uncertainty is weakening the first-mover-advantage while for high levels of
uncertainty growing uncertainty is strengthening the first-mover-advantage.
This ambiguous effect is based on two opposing effects, i.e.:@sA
@r
¼ @sA
@b
@b
@r
þ @sA
@b
@b
@d
@d
@r
: ð28ÞIt is easy to show that the first term is strictly positive while the second term of the RHS is strictly
negative. For significant high levels of uncertainty the impact of managerial flexibility, i.e. the first
term on the RHS dominates. Obviously, the total surplus generated by the investment project is ceteris
paribus the lower the more the investment is delayed relative to the situation of a central planner.
Therefore, controlling the exercise of the real option can be regarded as having some bargaining
power. But increasing uncertainty is diminishing this bargaining power of the second mover because
a postponement of the investment is less threatening to the first-mover, i.e. to A. In particular, A also
profits from a delayed investment due to a better information set and a higher flexibility value, respec-
tively. As a consequence the first-mover advantage as proxied by the size of sA increases. For small lev-
els of uncertainty, however, the second term of the RHS dominates. For such initial levels of
uncertainty we know that A’s propensity to invest increases as uncertainty increases due to the con-
venience yield effect. In particular, it becomes more attractive for the first-mover to possess the
investment project’s net cash flows. Because B, however, controls the exercise of the real option his
bargaining power increases while the first-mover’s bargaining power as a consequence decreases.
3. Numerical analysis
In the following our model is analyzed numerically. Hereby we assume the following values:
r ¼ 0:1; k ¼ 0:4; q ¼ 0:7; I ¼ 10; a ¼ 0:08; x0 ¼ 1 and t0 = 0.
As Fig. 1 depicts the investment threshold is higher after sequential bargaining between two par-
ties (black curves) than in the one party case (grey curves) described by Gryglewicz et al. (2008). How-
ever, independent of the fact whether the project-life is finite or infinite the influence of uncertainty
on the investment threshold shows a U-shape after sequential bargaining. Specifically, an increasing
fraction of the investment cost beard by the second player is shifting the curve upwards and to the
right and therefore is resulting in a further postponement of the investment. As has already been sta-
ted, the model of Gryglewicz et al. (2008), Wong (2007) and Sarkar (2000) can be seen as a special case
of our sequential-bargained model, indeed, if e = 0 both curves will be identical. Similar results hold for
the influence of uncertainty on the expected time until investment (see Fig. 2).
Now, we take a look on the third interpretation of the investment–uncertainty relationship, i.e. the
probability to invest within a pre-specified time of length s. According to Sarkar (2000) this probabil-
ity can be calculated byProbðt 6 sÞ ¼ U lnð
x0
xÞ þ ða 12r2Þs
r
ffiffiffi
s
p
 
þ x

x0
  a
r2
1
U
lnðx0xÞ  ða 12r2Þs
r
ffiffiffi
s
p
 
; ð29Þ
Fig. 1. Influence of uncertainty on the investment threshold x (black color: e = 0.5; grey color: e = 0; solid line: T =1; dashed
line: T = 10).
Fig. 2. Influence of uncertainty on the expected time until investment E[t] (black color: e = 0.5; grey color: e = 0; solid line:
T =1; dashed line: T = 10).
E. Lukas, A. Welling / Finance Research Letters 11 (2014) 25–35 33whereby U(  ) is the area under the standard normal distribution. A numerical example of the bar-
gaining case is given in Fig. 3. It can be seen that it matches with the example given by Sarkar
(2000). For low values of uncertainty increasing uncertainty is enhancing the probability that the
investment is carried out within the next five years while for higher values of uncertainty this prob-
ability is declining with increasing uncertainty.
Fig. 3. Influence of uncertainty on the probability to invest within 5 years. (e = 0.5; T =1).
Fig. 4. The shares of the surplus of the offering party (sA) and of the reacting party (sB) depending on the amount of uncertainty
and the size of incurred costs the parties face, e = 0.95 (black, dots), e = 0.5 (black, solid), and e = 0 (grey).
34 E. Lukas, A. Welling / Finance Research Letters 11 (2014) 25–35According to Proposition 7, the influence of uncertainty on the shares of the surplus of the two
players is ambiguous. As can be seen in Fig. 4 this influence is following a U-shape, too. Starting withlim
r!0
sA ¼
r
a 1þ e
r
a eþ ra 1
>
1
2
; ð30Þ
E. Lukas, A. Welling / Finance Research Letters 11 (2014) 25–35 35the share of the first player is first decreasing with increasing uncertainty. For higher levels of uncer-
tainty, however, the share of the first-player is increasing with increasing uncertainty. Under infinite
uncertainty the first-player would get the whole surplus, limr?1sA = 1.
From Fig. 4 it is also apparent that the ambiguity is controlled by the distribution of the investment
costs, i.e. (1  e)I and eI, respectively. In particular, should the first player bear no or moderate costs,
i.e. 0 6 e < 0:5, the ambiguity is well pronounced. This is due to the fact, that the second player makes
his timing decision contingent not only on the size of uncertainty but on the degree of irreversibility as
represented by the size of sunk costs, too. Consequently, the first mover profits from B’s managerial
flexibility the less cost he incurs. In contrast, the higher the fraction of overall costs devoted to A be-
comes the weaker becomes the ambiguous effect of uncertainty on the shares of the surplus. Hence,
should he incur the full cost, the sharing of surplus does no longer depend on the size of uncertainty. In
this limiting case, the result resembles the one of a simple ultimatum game.
4. Conclusion
While the standard real option optimization framework and the deduced uncertainty–investment
relationship, respectively, are characterized by a game against nature a proper treatment of games be-
tween individuals is missing. As an approach to fill this gap we have set up a model that builds on the
assumptions of Gryglewicz et al. (2008), Wong (2007) and Sarkar (2000) but treats investment timing
as an outcome of a sequential game with two individuals. The results show that a U-shaped invest-
ment–uncertainty relationship generally sustains. However, timing of an investment occurs ineffi-
ciently late. This inefficiency is increasing with the fraction of investment cost the second player
has to bear. Furthermore the results show that in the sequential bargaining game a first-mover-
advantage always prevails, i.e. the first player gets a higher fraction of the combined surplus than
the second player. The amount of this first-mover-advantage is influenced by uncertainty in a U-
shaped pattern, too. While for small values of uncertainty the first-mover-advantage is decreasing
with increasing uncertainty for higher values of uncertainty it is increasing with increasing uncer-
tainty. Future directions in which this work could be extended is to consider information asymmetries
or moral hazard and to investigate how these risks affect timing and optimal contracting (see e.g.
Hackbarth and Miao, 2012).
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